Wittgenstein, Lewis Carroll and the Philosophical Puzzlement of Language by Kind, Amy L.
33 
Wittgenstein, Lewis Carroll And The philosophical 







Alice felt dreadfully puzzled. The Hatter's remark 
seemed to her no sort of meaning in it, and yet it was certainly 
English. "I don't quite understand you," she said, as politely 
as she could. (l&, 61) 
When Lewis Carroll sends Alice down the rabbit hole in his fairy-tale 
masterpiece, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, he plunges her into a world of 
puzzlement. The characters speak English, and it is grammatically correct (even 
elegant) English, but Alice is nonetheless continually baffled by their use of 
language. In his PhilosQphical Inv!(;!tigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein discusses 
this type of puzzlement, describing philosophy as "a battle against the 
bewitchment of intelligence by means of language" CEl #109). In fact, 
Wittgenstein spends a large part of the Investigations attempting to show how 
philosophy must deal with the problems inherent in our use of language. 
But while Wittgenstein is concerned with finding an escape from the 
puzzlement, Carroll submerges himself furlher in the morass. In his fairy-tale 
masterpieces, Carroll uses and misuses language to achieve humor and charm; 
his heroine, in both Wonderland and ThrQugh !.he Looking Glass, continually 
meets with the very sources of philosophical puzzlement which Wittgenstein 
fears. The methods differ, but both Wittgenstein and Carroll admonish their 
readers to pay attention to language, pointing out the fallacy in assuming that we 
can understand a sentence simply because it is grammatically well-formed, 
containing familiar words. Peter Heath, in a philosophical analysis of the Alice 
books, describes Carroll's message as having the form 0[: 
a sottisier: a horrendous catalog of philosophical 
blunders, logical fallacies, conceptual confusions, and 
linguistic breakdowns, which do not only entertain but 
persistently tease the reader, compelling him to ask himself, 
"What has gone wrong here? Why won't this do?" and to find 
that it is not always perfectly easy to supply the answer.l 
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By this approach, Lewis Carroll conveys a message (or, as the duchess 
would say, a moral) which is strikingly like Wittgenstein's description of a 
philosophical problem as a statement of the form: "I don't know my way about" 
(£I, #123). According to this view of philosophical puzzlement, we start with a 
set of seemingly true propositions and are led to a conclusion that either seems 
extremely implausible or contradicts what we know to be true. In both cases, 
the outcome seems completely devoid of sense: "it can only be expressed by 
what strikes us as an illegitimate combination of words."2 
Furthermore, says Wittgenstein, when we are in the clutches of 
philosophical puzzlement we cannot look to any new facts for help. Unlike the 
empirical investigations of science, philosophy does not attempt to introduce 
new information - for there is no need to do so. Rather, philosophers must 
concentrate on finding a new understanding of the propositions, construing them 
in such a way that they are no longer seen as contradictory. Our pursuit is 
therefore best seen as interpretive: we shed light on our problem by clearing 
misunderstandings away - "misunderstandings concerning the use of words, 
caused, among other things, by certain analogies between the forms of 
expression in different regions of language" (£! #90). Philosophy must provide 
clarification by unraveling the confusion, not by formulating a new theory. 
This view, which emerges in the Investigations, is a departure from his 
earlier position in the Tractatus: 
The Wittgenstein of the Tractatus operates, as it were, 
on the same level as, say, Frege and Russell. He pursues 
problems they raised and gives answers that are at times the 
same and at times rival to theirs. He is playing more or less 
the same game ... The latcr Wittgenstein does not give answers 
or formulate ideas on the same level ... Were the later 
Wittgenstein to read a contemporary work of philosophy, he 
would not get down on all fours with it and dispute it. He 
would rather stand back, and seek to find the source of the 
author's ideas. which source would be held to be disguised 
nonsense.3 
The aim of philosophy, says the later Wittgenstein, is to "shew the fly the way 
out of the ny-bottle." ceI, #309) 
In contrast, it seems that Carroll makes no attempt to release the fly; but 
only ensnares it further. Throughout the Alice tales, Carroll draws on the 
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nonsense inherent in language, purposefully construing common statements in 
such a way as to cause bewilderment. For instance, at the mad tea-party: 
Alice sighed wearily. "I think you might do 
something better with time," she said, "than wasting it in 
asking riddles that have no answers." 
"If you knew Time as well as I do," said the Hatter, 
"you wouldn't talk about wasting it. It's him." 
"I don't know what you mean," said Alice. CAW, 63) 
Alice's confusion at the Hatter's description of "time" exemplifies what 
Wittgenstein means by philosophical puzzlement. The reference to "time" as 
something that can be known as a person can be known indicates a common, 
deeper problem of our language: we tend to be held captive by a picture of time, 
space, etc., that causes perplexity; "this kind of mistake recurs again and again 
in philosophy, e.g., when we are puzzled about the nature of time, when time 
seems to us a Queer thing." (BB, 6) 
The cause of the problem, says Wittgenstein, lies in an 
oversimplification of the function of language. We must not assume that all 
words function in the samw way. Even in identical contexts, words may be used 
differently: merely because the word "time" appears in sentences in the same 
position as, for example, "sugar" ("There's no left") or as "money" ("If we 
have we'll go to the store") does not mean that it represents an entity or a 
thing. (cf. PI #112, "A simile that has been absorbed into the forms of our 
language produces a false appearance, and this disquiets us"). 
As Wittgenstein says in the Blue Book, "the man who is 
philosophically puzzled sees a law in the way a word is used and trying to apply 
this law consistently, comes up against cases where it leads to paradoxical 
results." 27) However, in examining the actual circumstances behind our 
use of the word, we see that it is not a word like "money" or "sugar." Thus, the 
only means of escape from our philosophical puzzlement is the abandonment of 
our a priori picture of the use of words. We cannot "guess" how a word 
functions, but we have to look at each specific use. Once we "command a clear 
view of the use of words" (fl., #122), we can eliminate our confusion; we will 
no longer have to ask ourself "what is time?" for "we will realize that the very 
question is illegitimate, if it presupposes, as it seems to, that time is some kind 
ofthing."4 
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But-throughout the Alice Tales- Carroll delights in depicting this 
sort of "illegitimate questioning." For example, in DJrough the Looking Glass, 
he plays upon the concept of "nobody": 
"I see nobody on the road," said Alice. 
"I only wish I had such eyes," the King remarked in a 
fretful tone. "To be able to see Nobody! And at that distance 
tool Why it's as much as I can do to see people, by this light." 
<LQ., 198-9) .... 
"Who did you pass on the road?" The King went on, 
holding out his hand to the Messenger for some more hay. 
"Nobody," said the Messenger. 
"Quite right," said the King. "This young lady saw 
him too. So of course Nobody walks slower than you." (LQ" 
201) 
Once again, this illustrates Wittgenstein's point. In the Blue Book, he 
specifically points to problems with words such as "nobody," describing a 
possible language in which the problem would be even worse than common 
English. He asks us to envision a language in which "Mr. Nobody" would 
replace the term "nobody," so that for example, Alice's remark would be: "I see 
Mr. Nobody on the road." Imagine, he says, the problems that would arise from 
this! um.. 69). 
Another concept played upon by Carroll is the word "today." After the 
Queen offers Alice some jam, Alice responds: 
"Well, I don't want any ~ at any rate." 
"You couldn't have it if you gjQ want it," the Queen 
said. "The rule is, jam to-morrow and jam yesterday-but 
never jam lQ:ill!y." 
"It must come sometime to 'jam to-day,'" Alice 
objected. 
"No, it can't," said the Queen. "It's jam every ~ 
day: to-day isn't any ~ day, you know." 
"1 don't understand you," said Alice. "It's 
dreadfully confusing!" (L,Q., 174-5) 
Once again, we are sympathetic with Alice's confusion; Wittgenstein, 
too, speaks of this kind of mistake as being one of the "most fertile sources of 

philosophical puzzlement" am,J08). According to his discussion, we must 

resist the temptation to say that "now" and "6 p.m." refer to "point of time." 
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Using words in this way causes "the puzzlement which one might express in the 
question 'what is the "now"? - for it is a moment of time and yet it can't be 
said to be the "moment at which I speak" or "the moment at which the clock 
strikes", etc., etc.'" (lU!,109). We have only to look at Hegel's discussion of 
"the Now" in his Phenomenology of Mind to see an example of this kind of 
philosophical puzzle: 
To the question, What is the Now? we reply, for 
example, the Now is night-time. To test the truth of this 
certainty of sense, a simple experiment is all we need: write 
that truth down. A truth cannot lose anything by being written 
down, and just as little by our preserving and keeping it. If we 
look again at the truth we have written down,look at it now at 
this noon-time, and we shall have to say it has turned stale and 
become out of date.5 
As a result of these reflections, Hegel concludes that "the Now" is a !!Qt 
~, or a Universal.6 His conclusion results from bring caught in the clutches of 
a philosophical confusion; as Wittgenstein explains, the word "now" functions 
in a completely different way from the specifications of time. Although we 
could see this if we were to examine how the word "now" is used in our 
language, confusion reigns when we look only at small contexts and short 
phrases in which the Lerm appears, rather than at the entire languagc game. 
Alice and the Queen make a similar mistake in thcir discussion of the 
jam. The words "today" and "tomorrow" do not function as dates, likc 
"Monday" or "April 5th". Although they might seem to be used in the same 
way as these terms, we must look at the whole of the language game, and see 
that the word "tomorrow" is completely different from a specification of a date. 
When only a particular context is seen, as is the case in the discussion with the 
Queen, the role of the word is obscured, and it is no wonder that Alice is 
"dreadfully puzzled." 
Even as early as the Trac1atys, Wittgenstcin shows the confusion that 
can come about as a result of these kinds of problems in language: "Language 
disguises thought. So much so, that from the outward form of the clothing it is 
impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath it, because the outward form 
of the clothing is not designed to reveal the form of the body, but for entirely 
different purposes" (TLP, 4.002). Though language serves its purpose for 
ordinary human beings, providing themwith a means of communication, it was 
not designed to serve the purpose of the philosopher. Any English speaker, for 
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example, gets through everyday life perfectly well using words such as "time," 
"today," and "now." But when the philosopher attempts to analyze the 
meanings of these words, the overwhelming temptation is to succumb to false 
analogies, to see these words only within a narrow language context When 
doing so, philosophers make the mistake of treating words abstractly, as if they 
had no relationship to those around them. 
But words do have relationships to those around them; they are 
components of language games. For the later Wittgenstein, the whole of our 
language is a multitude of these language games. We must look at a word's use 
in the specific game, and not at its grammatical function, in order to glean its 
meaning. Expanding on the Tractatus idea that "only in the nexus of a 
proposition does a name have a meaning" (3.3), Wittgenstein tells us in the 
Investigations that each word has meaning only as part of the language game 
which is its "original home" (£I, #116). We must not lose sight of this fact, he 
stresses: "if we forget the intimate connections between language and behavior, 
and try to treat words in isolation from the actual practical situations which they 
are used, we end up in puzzlement."7 This kind of problem arises when 
"language goes on holiday" (£I, #38).8 
Humpty Dumpty, in ThrQlJgh the Looking Glass, amuses the reader 
with his imaginative use of English, but his speech is a clear illustration of 
"language on holiday." Though Humpty Dumpty scornfully tells Alice: "When 
I use a word ... it means just what I choose it to mean, neither more nor less" 
(L&, 190), he has used "to mean" illegitimately. We cannot pick a word and 
assign whatever meaning we choose, as Wittgenstein indicates in a note to the 
Investigations: "Can I say 'bububu' and mean 'If it doesn't rain I shall go for a 
walk'? -It is only in a language that I can mean something by something" (fl, 
p.IS). 
Humpty Dumpty misconstrues the role "to mean" plays in the language 
game; as Wittgenstein shows us, the function of "to mean" is not like the 
function of "to imagine" or "to say." Alice has previously been taught by the 
Hatler and the March Hare that "I mean what I say" is different from "I say what 
I mean" (};ii, 61);Humpty Dumpty has yet to learn this lesson. Distinguishing 
"surface grammar" from "depth grammar," Wiugenstein notes that our 
immediate impression of a word is the way it is used in a sentence, "the part of 
its use -one might say- that can be taken in by the ear" (fl, #664). He could 
almost be speaking of Humpty Dumpty in this remark; he even points 
specifically to the words "to mean." A comparison of the depth grammar with 
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our expectations from the surface grammar leads us into the puzzlement 
Humpty Dumpty remains unruffled by his failure to look beyond the surface, in 
fact, he uses the phrase "I make words mean what I want" in a fashion similar to 
"I make workers do what I want''9 and even goes as far as to tell Alice he gives 
the words additional wages when he forces them to do "extra work." 
There are many other places in the Alice books Where Carroll sends 
language on vacation and a lot of passages which seem, at fIrst glance, to be 
completely nonsensical. However, "nonsense" is a term we apply without 
discrimination to anything failing to make sense. In his article, Heath suggests 
that a distinction should be drawn between nonsense and absurdity, where "the 
former neglects and defies the ordinary conventions of logic, linguistic usage, 
motive and behavior, [and] the latter makes all too much of them."tO Regarded 
in this way, Carroll's works are incorrectly classified as nonsense, and we 
should see him instead as a matter of the absurd: 
Instead of blithely departing from the rules, as the 
nonsense-writer does, the absurdist persists in adhering to 
them long after it has ceased to be sensible to do so, and 
regardless of the extravagances which thereby result. This is 
what Carroll and his characters habitually do. II 
Though Wittgenstein did not draw this distinction in his writings, he 
did distinguish between "disguised nonsense" and "patent nonsense," indicating 
that his aim was to show how one could pass from the former to the latter. (£L 
464). With this differentiation, it seems clear that the Alice books fall under the 
heading of "patent nonsense," and thus, Carroll has aided Wittgenstein in 
accomplishing his task. If the fly can get out of the fly-bottle by recognizing 
patent nonsense, then Carroll has provided an escape route. philosophical 
problems arise because fundamental mistakes are made deep in the language 
game. These mistakes, misinterpretations of language, have the feature of being 
ingrained deep within us, and it is the philosopher's task to bring them to the 
surface. By doing so, as Carroll does in the Alice books, we can see the puzzle 
more clearly and (it is hoped) proceed to solve it. 
As Wittgenstein suggests: "Let us ask ourselves: why do we feel a 
grammatical joke to be ~?" (£!, #1l1). It has been reported that Wittgenstein 
used to cite, as an example of a good grammatical joke, the Mock Turtle's 
remark CAYi., 84) "We called him Tortoise because he taught us." 12 
Grammatical jokes sllch as these abound in the Alice books, for example, when 
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the Gryphon tells Alice that boots and shoes under the sea are made with "soles 
and eels" (A:U.., 92), when the Mouse tells Alice the driest story he knows 
because she is sopping wet CAYi. 25), or when Alice learns aoout lessons: 
"And how many hours a day did you do lessons?" 
said Alice, in a hurry to change the subject. 
"Ten hours the first day," said the Mock Turtle: 
"Nine the next, and so on." 
"What a curious plan!" exclaimed Alice. 
"That's the reason they're called lessons," the 
Gryphon remarked: "because they lessen from day to day." 
(A:U..,87). 
In fact, it is precisely the recurrent use of grammatical jokes that lends 
Carroll's work its wit and irony. 
But puzzles of language, besides being at the very heart of the ~ 
books, are crucial to Wittgenstein's Investigations. Discerning the puzzle is, for 
Wittgenstein, a necessary component of philosophy; if we do not suffer from 
this kind of puzzlement, then we cannot see the need for further philosophical 
inquiry. The philosopher must necessarily be immersed in a state of bafflement, 
the subsequent outcome of which is "the uncovering of one or another piece of 
plain nonsense and of bumps that the understanding has got by running its head 
up against the limits oflanguagc." (PI, #119). 
Thus, Wittgenstein iY.IDltS. us to see the puzzle, and it is in this sense that 
sharp parallels can be drawn between his endeavor and the works of CarrolL 
Carroll is a master of presenting the puzzle, and surely no one comes away from 
a reading of the Alice books without a sense that something strange is going on 
with language; even a child gains an increased comprehension of the importance 
of words.13 Furthermore, Wittgenstein is known to have read the works of 
Carroll; along with the two specific references to Carroll in the Investigations, 
this suggests it may not be coincidence that some of Wittgenstein 's examples of 
sources of philosophical confusion overlap with the puzzles in the Alice books. 
But, though Carroll has shown us the puzzle, and like Alice, we know 
that something has gone wrong, it is philosophy's job to c1ear up the confusion. 
As Wittgenstein indicates in the Blue BOQk: "Philosophy, as we use the word, is 
a fight against the fascination which forms of expression exert upon us" 011i, 
27). Carroll leaves the reader in this state of fascination, but, as Wittgenstein 
tells us, it is only through philosophy - and a close examination of the 
language games played- that we can lead the reader out of bafflement, the fly 
out of the fly-bottle, and Alice out of Wonderland. 
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